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Kobach: Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 20

Kris W. Kobach *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen an unprecedented number of state laws
proposed and enacted on the subject of illegal immigration.1 In addition,
municipalities across the country have enacted ordinances designed to
discourage illegal immigration and the employment of unauthorized
aliens.2 Some observers have suggested that these efforts are simply the
result of energized political activists, frustrated with inaction in3
Congress, turning their attention to state and local legislation.
According to this view, such state and local laws are merely spillover
consequences of the larger debate regarding controversial immigration
bills in Congress.
These explanations do not accurately reflect what has been
happening in the effort to confront illegal immigration at the state and
local level.. To be sure, frustration with congressional inaction
sometimes fuels enthusiasm for state and local action. But that
explanation does not fully account for what has been occurring in state
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri (Kansas City) School of Law. A.B. 1988,
Harvard University; M. Phil. 1990, Oxford University; D. Phil. 1992, Oxford University; J.D. 1995,
Yale Law School. During 2001-03, the author was White House Fellow and Counsel to United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft, serving as the Attorney General's chief adviser on
immigration law and border security. The author is also counsel representing the municipalities of
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Valley Park, Missouri, and Farmers Branch, Texas, and counsel advising
the state of Arizona in the defense of illegal-immigration-related ordinances and statutes.
1. In 2007, at least 1562 immigration bills were submitted, up from 570 in 2006. Of the bills
submitted, 240 were enacted into law, up from 84 in 2006. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT: 2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO
AND
IMMIGRATION
I
(2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007
Immigrationfinal.pdf.
2. See Hazelton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1722 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Damien Cave, States Take New Tack on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2008, at Al (reporting that "inaction" on the part of the federal government has caused state
legislatures to give "local authorities wider berth" on immigration matters); Julia Preston, Judge
Voids Ordinanceon Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at A14 (describing the decision
by a Hazelton, Pennsylvania judge to strike down a local immigration ordinance and the reactions
thereto).
IMMIGRANTS
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legislatures and city halls nationwide. Independent forces motivate state
and local governments to confront illegal immigration within their
respective jurisdictions. While illegal immigration is a national issue, the
consequences are felt first and foremost at the state and local level.
II.

THE FISCAL BURDEN

Without question, the most significant force driving action at the
state and local level is a fiscal one. In city after city, and state after state,
governments have acted for one overriding reason: they can't afford not
to. Illegal immigration is expensive. 4 And the taxpayer bears an
extraordinary burden in any city or state that includes a large population
of illegal aliens.5 The net cost of illegal immigration at all levels of

government (minus any tax revenues derived from illegal aliens) is
massive. In 2007, Robert Rector of The Heritage Foundation published

the most comprehensive and rigorous study to date on the net fiscal cost
of illegal immigration. 6 His study concluded that low-skilled aliens
(defined as those households "headed by immigrants without a high
4. ROBERT RECTOR, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE FISCAL COST OF LoW-SKILL IMMIGRANTS
TO STATE AND LOCAL TAXPAYERS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
(2007),
THE
JUDICIARY
15-16
HOUSE
COMMITTEE
ON
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
http://www.heritage.org/research/immigration/tst052107a.cfm [hereinafter RECTOR TESTIMONY].
5. 1 use the term "illegal alien" because it is a legally accurate term used repeatedly in the
immigration laws of the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1356(r)(3)(ii) (2000) ("expenses
associated with the detention of illegal aliens"); id. § 1366(1) (2000) ("the number of illegal aliens
incarcerated in Federal and State prisons"). Another phrase that is used throughout the immigration
laws of the United States is "alien not lawfully present in the United States." See, e.g., id.
§ 1229a(c)(2) (2000) ("the alien has the burden of establishing.., by clear and convincing
evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States"); id. § 1357(g)( 10) (2000) ("for any
officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State ...otherwise to cooperate with the
Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully
present in the United States"). This term, however, is a bit too cumbersome for a writing of this
nature. A third term, "unauthorized alien," is found in federal immigration laws, but is limited to the
employment context. See, e.g., id. § 1324a(a) (2000) ("to hire, or to recruit, or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien"); id.
§ 1324b(a)(l) (2000) ("other than an unauthorized alien, as defined in section 1324a(h)(3) of this
title"). In contrast, the ambiguous terms "undocumented immigrant" and "undocumented alien" do
not appear anywhere in the immigration laws of the United States. See id. § 1101, et seq. (2000).
Accordingly, I will use the shorter of the two appropriate terms recognized by federal statute,
namely "illegal alien."
6. See ROBERT RECTOR, CHRISTINE KIM & SHANEA WATKINS, THE HERITAGE FOUND.,
HERITAGE SPECIAL REPORT: THE FISCAL COST OF Low-SKILL HOUSEHOLDS TO THE U.S.
RECTOR
[hereinafter
http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/srl2.cfm
TAXPAYER (2007),
REPORT]. In 2005, another study estimated, with considerably less detailed analysis, that the net cost
of illegal immigration was approximately $65 billion a year. ROBERT JUSTICH & BETTY NG, BEAR
STEARNS ASSET MGMT., INC., THE UNDERGROUND LABOR FORCE Is RISING TO THE SURFACE 2
(2005), www.bearsteams.com/bscportal/pdfs/underground.pdf.
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school diploma" and comprised predominantly of households headed by
illegal aliens) impose a net fiscal cost of $89.1 billion a year.7 Those
figures reflect all sorts of government services, from primary and
secondary education to medical care to costs of criminal incarceration, to
the use of general public goods by low-skilled alien households. 8
State and local governments bear the majority of that burden.
According to 2002 federal government figures, the net cost of illegal
immigration at the federal level was $10.4 billion a year. 9 Not
surprisingly, because most of the $89.1 billion falls on the shoulders of
state and local governments, there has been an extraordinary amount of
activity at the state and local level to discourage illegal immigration into
the communities' respective jurisdictions.10
Arizona is a case in point. In 2007, Arizona became the first state in
the union to enact a law requiring all employers to use the "E-Verify"
system to verify the employment authorization of all newly-hired
employees. 1 That law was later sustained by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit against a legal challenge brought by a
coalition of interest groups in the state. 1 2 This was the fourth in a line of
Arizona statutes and popular initiatives designed to reduce illegal
immigration. The first was Proposition 200, which was passed in 2004
with over fifty-five percent of the vote.1 3 Proposition 200 denied public
benefits to illegal aliens.1 4 The second was Arizona's law against human
smuggling, enacted in 2005.15 The third was Arizona's Proposition 300,

7. See RECTOR TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 10. Rector's testimony is based on the full

report. See RECTOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
8. RECTOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 4, 6.
9. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP
LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 5 (2004), http://www.cis.org/
articles/2004/fiscal.pdf.
10. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212 to -214 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-1
(2007); see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
11. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212 to -214; Ariz. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v.
Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1060 (D. Ariz. 2008). In 2008, Mississippi became the second
state in the country to mandate that all private businesses use the E-Verify system. See Mississippi
Employment Protection Act, S.B. 2988 (Mar. 17, 2008).
12. See generally Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, No. 07-17272, 2008 WL

4225536 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008). The author served as counsel on the legal team defending the
Arizona statute.
13. See Ariz. Sec'y of State, 2004 General Election, http://www.azsos.gov/election
/2004/General/Canvass2004General.pdf (last visited June 28, 2008).
14. David Kelly, Illegal Immigrant Measure Upheld.- Judge Says Arizona Can Enforce a
PropositionBarringSome Services to the Undocumented, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at A13.

15.

That law was challenged in state court on preemption grounds and was sustained. Arizona

v. Salazar, No. CR2006-005932-003 DT, slip. op. at 6-9 (Super. Ct. of Ariz., June 9, 2006). The
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which denied in-state tuition rates and other post-secondary education
benefits to illegal aliens;
Proposition 300 passed with a stunning 71.4
16
percent of the vote.
This series of measures reflected the growing realization among
voters and legislators that Arizona taxpayers were under siege as a result
of illegal immigration. The total cost of providing services to Arizona's
17
estimated 475,000 illegal aliens is approximately $1.3 billion a year.
The biggest ticket item is providing free public primary and secondary
education to children in illegal alien-headed households; doing so cost
Arizona taxpayers approximately $748.3 million in 2005.8 When
Arizona's 2007 statute requiring employers to use the E-Verify system
prompted thousands of illegal aliens to self-deport, the Arizona school
system immediately began to experience some relief, with a $48.6
million surplus suddenly appearing in Fiscal Year ("FY") 2008.1'
Another large source of taxpayer expense lies in the cost of incarcerating
illegal alien criminals in Arizona's state prison system, which is
approximately $80 million a year.20
Arizona's fiscal burden may not come as a great surprise, given its
location on the border. However, as has been often said, every state is a
border state now. 21 Numerous other states have experienced a recent
influx of illegal immigration. For example, Georgia saw its illegal alien
population nearly double from 228,000 in 2000 to an estimated 440,000
in 2007, and Georgia taxpayers soon experienced the fiscal burdens that

author served as counsel assisting Maricopa County, Arizona, in its defense of the law against the

preemption challenge.
16. Ariz. Sec'y of State, 2006 General Election (Unofficial Results), http://www.azsos.gov/
results/2006/general/BM300.htm.
17.

FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, ARIZONA: ILLEGAL ALIENS (2007), available at

http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research-research82b2.
18. JACK MARTIN, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, BREAKING THE PIGGY BANK:
How ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS SENDING SCHOOLS INTO THE RED (2007), available at

http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/mfh-dec-07.pdf.
19.

J. LEGIS. BUDGET COMM., MONTHLY FISCAL HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2007), available at

http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/mfh-dec-07.pdf. See also Jacques Billeaud, Employer-Sanctions Law
Forces Illegal Immigrants to Move On, ASSOCIATED PRESS, SIERRA VISTA HERALD, Mar. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.svherald.com/articles/2008/03/03/news/doc47cb9f7cl4db5486886624.txt
(reporting that many illegal immigrants left Arizona after laws were passed to reduce spending on
educating and providing health care for illegal immigrants).
20. The $80 million estimate is based upon 2004 figures. FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION
REFORM, supra note 17.
21. See, e.g., Kathy Kiely, Immigration Issue Takes Flight, USA TODAY, July 20, 2006, at
4A; Andy Sher, Ex-Rivals Pledge to Back Corker, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. 6,

2006, at 10A.
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came with this influx. 22 The total cost is approximately $1.2 billion a
year, of which the cost of providing free public education is
approximately $952 million a year.23 Predictably, in 2006 the Georgia
Legislature responded to these fiscal burdens by enacting the Georgia
Security and Immigration Compliance Act to discourage further illegal
immigration into the state.24 The fiscal cost of illegal immigration
prompted other states in the interior of the country to enact omnibus
immigration bills in the years that followed-most notably, Oklahoma in
2007 and Missouri in 2008.25
A similar increase in fiscal burdens often drives cities to act. This
was demonstrated clearly in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which enacted its
Illegal Immigration Relief Act in 2006.26 Hazleton's population
exploded from approximately 22,000 in the 2000 census to 30,00033,000 in 2005.27 However, the earned income tax receipts on which the
city relied for its revenues remained flat. This reflected the fact that
much of the population increase was due to illegal immigration, and the
new arrivals were either working off the books or earning so little that
they were paying little or nothing in taxes.28 Meanwhile, expenditures
for routine city services that reflect the size of the population, such as
trash removal, increased by nearly fifty-percent. 29 Expenditures by the
local school district for its English as a Second Language program rose
from $500 in 2000 to over $1.1 million in 2006.30 The fiscal pressures
pushing the City to reduce the burdens of illegal immigration were
undeniable.
Such city ordinances and state statutes designed to discourage
illegal immigration have been sustained repeatedly in the courts of the
United States against federal preemption challenges. In 1976, in the
22. See FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, EXTENDED

IMMIGRATION DATA FOR

GEORGIA
(2008), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research
_research3920.
23. Id.
24. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-1 (2007).
25. Mo. Conf. Comm. Subst. for H.B. 1549, 1771, 1395 and 2366 (2008), codified at MO.
REV. STAT. § 285.530; Okla. H.B. 1804 (2007), codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 71 (West
2008).
26. That ordinance is the subject of litigation currently pending before the Third Circuit of the
U.S. Court of Appeals (Case No. 07-3531). The author is lead attorney representing the City of
Hazleton in the appeal from the decision of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See Lozano v.
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477,484, 554 (M.D. Penn. 2007).
27. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
28. Joint Appendix at A1647, A1399-1400, A2290-91, Lozano v. Hazleton, No. 07-3531 (3d
Cir. filed Apr. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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landmark case of DeCanas v. Bica, the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained a California law that imposed sanctions on the
employers of illegal aliens. 3 1 Then, in 1986, Congress expressly carved
out a window for states and cities to act by suspending the business
licenses of those businesses that employ unauthorized aliens.32 In
addition, Congress enacted other legislation in the 1990s that
demonstrated its objective of promoting state and local assistance in
discouraging illegal immigration. 33 As a result, recent state and local
laws discouraging illegal immigration have been sustained in federal
courts. Arizona's 2007 employment law was sustained by the District of
Arizona and thereafter by the Ninth Circuit. 34 Moreover, the Eastern
District of Missouri sustained a Valley Park, Missouri, ordinance that
provided for the suspension of the business licenses of employers of
unauthorized aliens.35 These statutes and ordinances allow cities and
states to take measured steps to reinforce compliance with federal
immigration law in their jurisdictions.
Not only have such efforts succeeded against preemption
challenges in court, they have also been successful in reducing illegal
immigration within the jurisdictions involved.36 Illegal aliens quickly
become aware of which cities and states have taken steps to reinforce the
rule of law in immigration. In February 2008, United States Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff noted the impact of such laws in
deterring illegal immigration: "The state of Arizona... in the last
31. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1975).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000).
33. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 203-08 (2005).
34. See generally Ariz. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Ariz.
2008), affd sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, No. 07-17272, 2008 WL 4225536
(9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008);
35. Gray v. Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881(ERW), 2008 WL 294294, at *9-10, *30-31 (E.D.
Mo., Jan. 31, 2008). The plaintiffs who lost before the District Court appealed the decision on
jurisdictional grounds to the Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. Gray v. Valley
Park, No. 08-1681 (8th Cir. filed Aug. 15, 2008). That appeal is pending at the time of this writing.
The author is serving as lead counsel defending the City of Valley Park, Missouri. The only federal
court to reach a different holding in a final order is the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484, 554 (M.D. Penn.
2007). The Middle District of Pennsylvania set aside the binding Supreme Court precedent of
DeCanas.Id. at 524.
36. This success has been most notable in Arizona, where the 2007 law requiring E-Verify
participation and prohibiting the knowing employment of unauthorized aliens prompted the selfdeportation of thousands of illegal aliens when the law became effective on January 1,2008. Randal
C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of Flight by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2008, at A13;
Daniel Gonzilez, Apartments Going Empty as Hiring Law Hits Migrants,ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan.
31, 2008, at Al.
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couple of days had its new rule requiring E-Verify use sustained by the
federal courts, and we are beginning to see that illegal workers are
picking up and leaving .... I think we've really been making some
substantial progress with the help of state and local governments. 37 The
combination of state and local action with stepped-up federal
enforcement activity produced dramatic results in 2007-08. For the first
time in many years, the illegal alien population in the United States
actually decreased by an estimated 1.3 million between August 2007
and May 2008-a decrease that began prior to the general decline in
employment in the United States and therefore could not be attributed
primarily to a slowing economy.3 8
III.

AMNESTY

Is NOT THE

ANSWER

Despite the fact that such enforcement efforts have proven effective
in inducing illegal aliens to self-deport, proponents of a massive amnesty
for illegal aliens assert that amnesty is nevertheless necessary to "solve"
the illegal immigration problem in one easy step. 39 This facile assertion
completely ignores the fiscal costs of illegal immigration. Although
allowing millions of illegal aliens to adjust to a legal status does
"reduce" the population of illegal aliens (by redefining them as lawfully
present), it achieves little else. Giving illegal aliens a path to a legal
status does virtually nothing to reduce the fiscal burden imposed by
illegal immigration.
Indeed, amnesty exacerbates the fiscal costs of illegal immigration.
Making illegal aliens legal does not make them fiscally positive. On the
contrary, it makes them eligible for more government benefits,
especially at the federal level-where the newly-legalized aliens become
eligible for a wide range of entitlements. One of the biggest is Social
Security benefits. For example, the amnesty proposal that was debated
and rejected in the United States Senate in 200740 would have cost

37. Sec'y of Homeland Sec. Michael B. Chertoff& U.S. Attorney Gen. Michael B. Mukasey,
Remarks at a Briefing on Immigration Enforcement and Border Security Efforts (Feb. 22, 2008),
availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/prj 1203722713615.shtm.
38. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN JENSENIUS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
HOMEWARD BOUND: RECENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE DECLINE IN THE ILLEGAL

ALIEN POPULATION (July 2008), http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back808.pdf.
39. 1define amnesty in immigration law the way most people understand it: providing a legal
status to large categories of illegal aliens (regardless of whether or not "fines" or other fees are
imposed upon recipients of the amnesty).
40. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S.A. 1150, 110th Cong. § 601(0(2) (proposed
amendment to S. 1348).
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approximately $2.6 trillion, 4 1 resulting in the largest expansion of the
welfare state in thirty years.42 It would also have hastened the
bankruptcy of the Social Security system.43 Meanwhile, amnesty would
have done nothing to reduce the fiscal burdens borne by American cities
and states. In short, amnesty is expensive at every level of government.
Another consequence of "solving" the illegal immigration problem
through amnesty is rampant fraud by amnesty applicants. We know this
from experience. In 1986, as part of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act ("IRCA"), the first and largest amnesty was granted to
approximately 2.7 million "seasonal agricultural workers. 44 Amnesty
immediately led to a surge in illegal immigration as hundreds of
thousands of new illegal aliens entered in order to fraudulently claim
that they were eligible for amnesty. 45 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") detected 398,000 cases of possible
fraud-some from illegal aliens who arrived after IRCA was passed,
others from illegal aliens already in the United States who submitted46
fraudulent applications claiming that they were eligible for amnesty.
There were undoubtedly many more cases that the INS never detected.
In addition to causing a spike in unlawful alien entries by aliens
seeking to fraudulently claim amnesty, the 1986 amnesty also
encouraged millions of illegal aliens to enter the United States in
succeeding years, in the hope that they would benefit from the next
amnesty.47 Of course, in 1986, the amnesty was advertised as the one
and only amnesty that the United States would ever grant. 48 The
incoming illegal aliens did not believe it. The 1990s witnessed the
greatest wave of illegal immigration ever.49 In retrospect, the illegal
41.

ROBERT RECTOR, THE HERITAGE FOUND., AMNESTY WILL COST U.S. TAXPAYERS AT

LEAST $2.6 TRILLION

1 (2007),

http://www.heritage.org/Research/lmmigration/wml490.cfm

("Overall, the net cost to taxpayers of retirement benefits for anmesty recipients is likely to be at
least $2.6 trillion.") [hereinafter RECTOR RESEARCH].
42. ROBERT E. RECTOR AND CHRISTINE KIM, THE FISCAL COST OF Low-SKILL IMMIGRANTS
TO THE U.S. TAXPAYER 22 (2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/Immigration/srl4.cfm.
43. RECTOR RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 6.
44. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 301 (1986).
45. Roberto Suro, False Migrant Claims: Fraud on a Huge Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1989, at A1; RECTOR RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 6.
46. Suro, supra note 45, at Al.
47. Robert Pear, '86 Law Looms Over Immigration Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007, at A 1;
RECTOR RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 9.
48. John Comyn, Immigration Reform: Back to the Future, May 1, 2006,
http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/44.pdf.
49. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, EIGHT MILLION ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN 2000: CENSUS BUREAU FINDING RAISES CONCERN OVER BORDER CONTROL IN LIGHT OF
TERRORIST THREAT (2001), http://www.cis.org/articles/200 I /censusrelease 100 l.html.
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aliens were right-plenty of Senators in 2007 felt no compulsion to
observe the pledge that Congress made in 1986. There is no reason to
believe that the results would be different the next time around.
Another problem with fraud in amnesty applications is the fact that
individual terrorists have successfully obtained amnesty in the past, and
more terrorists will almost certainly do so if another major amnesty is
offered in the future. For example, Mahmud "The Red" Abouhalima, a
leader of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was legalized as a
seasonal agricultural worker as part of the 1986 amnesty. 50 He had
actually been working as a cab driver. 5 1 His newly-acquired legal status
allowed him to travel abroad, including several trips to Pakistan where
he received terrorist training.52 His brother, Mohammed, who was also
involved in the 1993 attack, received amnesty as well.53
The proposed amnesty of 2007 would have been particularly
vulnerable to terrorist manipulation. The process outlined in the amnesty
legislation would have given United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services ("USCIS") only one business day to do a quick background
check before issuing a provisional Z visa. 54 Supporters of the bill
apparently imagined that the United States government possessed a
massive database of all the world's terrorists and criminals, in searchable
digital format. But the reality is that the United States still relies on
many paper records. Plus, much of the information that is necessary to
properly screen amnesty applicants is in the hands of foreign
governments. Obtaining such information in twenty-four hours is
difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the 2007 amnesty bill also did not
require any photo identification sufficient to verify an applicant's
asserted identity-which meant that an alien terrorist would have been
free to invent an entirely clean, fictional name and obtain amnesty (and a
federal ID) under that name. An applicant could have stated that his
name was "Rumpelstiltskin" and produced a few easily-falsified

50. 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: A STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 194 (2004); MARK KRIKORIAN, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, SECURING THE HOMELAND THROUGH IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT,
TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
BORDER
SECURITY,
AND
CLAIMS
(2003),
SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
IMMIGRATION,

http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/msktestimony410.html.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, supra note 50, at 190.
54. KRIS W. KOBACH, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE SENATE IMMIGRATION BILL: A
NATIONAL SECURITY NIGHTMARE 2 (2007), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Imrnmigration

/wm1513.cfm.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1323

documents attributable to such a name. In all likelihood, USCIS would
have had no basis on which to deny the application. 5
The proposed amnesty of 2007 would have also resulted in a
complete breakdown of the USCIS bureaucracy. That is a reality of
which many Senators were apparently unaware in June 2007. Assume
that twelve million illegal aliens would have applied for the amnesty.
The bill required illegal aliens to file their initial applications within one
year.56 There are 250 days in the calendar year on which the federal
government is open for business.57 That means that there would have
been an average of 48,000 applications for the probationary Z visas
every day, with significant fluctuations from that average likely to occur.
There are approximately 3000 status adjudicators employed by USCIS.
This number cannot be increased quickly, due to the difficulty of hiring
new adjudicators, and the delay of training them. The Senate bill of 2007
would have only added a paltry one hundred status adjudicators a year
for five years-"subject to the availability of appropriations. '' 58 48,000
applications spread among 3000 status adjudicators meant an average of
sixteen amnesty applications per adjudicator, per day. Of course, on
some days, the number of applications could have been double that
amount. And with each application, the adjudicator would have had only
one day to discover if the alien is a criminal or a national security threat.
It is a bleak picture. Unfortunately, it gets worse. Those numbers
assumed that the adjudicators were not already busy. In FY 2005,
USCIS received 6.3 million applications for immigration benefits-on
top of a backlog of several million unresolved applications.59 USCIS was
already stretched to the breaking point. According to a 2006
Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study, because adjudicators
had to go through so many applications for benefits (permanent
residency applications, asylum applications, etc.) every day, they spent
too little time scrutinizing them. 60 As a result, the GAO concluded,
failure to detect fraud was already "an ongoing and serious problem" at
the agency. 6' The backbreaking workload created a "'high-pressure'
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production environment., 62 It is widely known that an unofficial "sixminute rule" applies in some offices-spend no more than six minutes
looking at any single application. 63 It is a bureaucratic sweatshop.
As a result, USCIS does not regularly engage in commonsense
verification with outside agencies-for example, calling a state's
Department of Motor Vehicles to see if two people claiming to be
married actually live at the same address. Such detailed scrutiny is too
time-consuming.64 And many adjudicators are actually discouraged from
requesting more information from aliens who submit suspicious
applications. So what would the 2007 Senate amnesty bill have done?
Triple the incoming workload by adding approximately twelve million
amnesty applications in a single year. Not only that, the twelve million Z
visa holders would have had to come back in four years to renew their
amnesty status. The six-minute rule would have become a defacto twominute rule. Millions of fraudulent applications likely would have been
accepted.65 It was "a recipe for bureaucratic collapse. 66
However, even if granting amnesty to twelve million illegal aliens
could be accomplished with ease, it would not alleviate the burden that
so many cities and states are bearing. Illegal immigration is expensivevery expensive-for the cities and states in which the illegal aliens live.
An amnesty, like so many "solutions" that gain currency in the halls of
Congress, is no solution at all.
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66. Id. If the 2007 bill had been enacted, it is likely that USCIS would have responded to the
impossible bureaucratic task of implementing the amnesty by hiring contractors to review the
amnesty applications. Doing so would have increased the total number of personnel available, but it
would have created its own complications. The independent contractors likely would have lacked
experience in detecting fraudulent applications, and the federal government would have been hard
pressed to conduct security investigations on the independent contractors in time to implement the
initial stages of the amnesty.
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